Dismissal 707 B

DISMISSAL–707(b)

In re Egebjerg, 574 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 2009)

A debtor’s obligation to repay a loan taken from his retirement plan is not a debt, and thus

cannot be deducted from his income as a secured debt under the means test. Without deciding

whether “other necessary expenses” is a concept limited to the fifteen categories of expenses listed

in the IRS manual, or the broader definition provided in that manual, the court finds that retirement

loans fall under neither interpretation; nor do they qualify as a “special circumstance.”

Blausey v. U.S. Trustee, 552 F.3d 1124 (9th Cir. 2009)

Private disability insurance payments must be include in the calculation of current monthly

income.

In re Ransom, 380 B.R. 799 (9th Cir. BAP 2007), aff’d, 577 F.3d 1026 (9th Cir. 2009)

In determining “projected disposable income” of an above-median income debtor in a

chapter 13 case, the means test does not permit the debtor to claim a vehicle ownership expense

for a vehicle owned free and clear of any liens.

Hebbring v. U.S. Trustee, 463 F.3d 902 (9th Cir. 2006)

The Bankruptcy Code does not per se disallow voluntary contributions to a retirement plan

as a reasonably necessary expense in calculating disposable income. Courts must examine the

totality of the circumstances on a case-by-case basis, including age and financial circumstances.

Debtor here only owed about $12,000 in unsecured debt and was only 33 years old.

In re Khachikyan, 335 B.R. 121 (9th Cir. BAP 2005)

Debtor’s filing of a chapter 7 case 17 months after accumulating about $120,000 in credit

card debt is not a form of abuse that should overcome the presumption in favor of chapter 7 relief.

In re Voelkel, 322 B.R. 138 (9th Cir. BAP 2005)

Bankruptcy court applied wrong standard in dismissing chapter 7 case for substantial

abuse. Abuse must be clear, and debtor is not required to live at a subsidence level.

In re Price, 353 F.3d 1135 (9th Cir. 2004)

1. Real estate mortgages are included in the calculation of consumer debt under this

section, regardless of whether they are to be discharged; 2. although the ability to pay debts in a

chapter 13 case would, standing alone, justify dismissal under this section, it is not a per se rule. It

is merely the most important consideration.

In re Harris, 279 B.R. 254 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 2002)

Evidence failed to establish substantial abuse under § 707(b)

In re Gomes, 220 B.R. 84 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 1998) – 707(b)

Debtors’ ability to repay 43 percent of unsecured debt under three-year chapter 13 plan

supported dismissal of Chapter 7 case for substantial abuse

.

In re Kelly, 841 F.2d 908 (9th Cir. 1988) – § 707(b)

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A finding that debtors are able to repay their debts as they came due or to fund a Chapter

13 plan = substantial abuse. Debtors had paid all unsecured debt prepetition except judgment for

fraud. Court held mortgage debt = consumer debt.

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